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We address the role of labor cost differentials for national tax policies. Using a simple 
theoretical framework with two countries competing for a mobile firm, we show that in a 
bidding race for FDI, it is optimal for governments to compensate firms for international labor 
cost differentials. Using panel data for western Europe, we then put the model prediction to an 
empirical test. Exploiting exogenous variation in labor cost differentials induced by the 
breakdown of communism in eastern Europe, we find strong support for the model prediction 
that countries with relatively high labor costs tend to set lower tax rates in order to attract 
mobile capital. Our key result is that an increase in the unit labor cost differential by one 
standard deviation decreases the statutory tax rate by 7.3 to 7.5 percentage points. 
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The last decades have seen an unprecedented level of ﬁrm mobility, leaving govern-
ments in a situation of intense inter-jurisdictional competition for real capital. It
is widely believed that this competition was the main driving force behind the re-
markable downward trend in corporate tax rates that has accompanied the process
of economic integration between European countries since the 1980s (Devereux et al.,
2008; Overesch and Rincke, 2010).
Although the negative trend in corporate income taxes in Europe is a well known
phenomenon, there is a noteworthy facet that has so far been largely overlooked.
As shown in Figure 1, the average statutory tax rate of those western European
countries located geographically at the border to formerly communist eastern Europe
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Sweden) was substantially
higher than the average tax in western countries located farther away from eastern
Europe throughout the 1980s. Around 1990, this tax diﬀerential began to narrow
signiﬁcantly, until it stabilized at a level of just three to ﬁve percentage points after
1994.
Although it seems natural to think of the breakdown of communism in eastern Eu-
rope and the following integration of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the other
transition economies with western Europe as the driving force behind the adjustment
of statutory tax rates in those western European countries directly exposed to the
integration shock, the ultimate economic factors leading to the tax decline are far
from obvious. In particular, as noted by Overesch and Rincke (2009), is does not
seem that competition over corporate income tax rates was driving the adjustment
process, because the transition countries had tax levels exceeding those in the west-
ern countries until 1994. Hence, the downward adjustment of corporate tax levels in
the border countries was achieved at a time when the new competitors for FDI had
not yet implemented competitive tax policies. This ﬁnding suggests to look for other
determinants of the relative decrease in tax levels in countries located at the eastern
























edge of western Europe. Given the characteristics of the transition countries at the
beginning of the 1990s, it seems natural to think of the tax adjustment in the border
countries as a response to the sudden integration with eastern Europe as a low-wage
region.
Guided by the beforementioned example, the paper analyzes the role of labor cost
diﬀerentials in international competition for FDI. The key point for considering wage
diﬀerentials is straightforward: In a world of integrated capital markets, labor costs
are important determinants of ﬁrms’ location decisions, and governments competing
for FDI should take this into account when designing their tax policies.
The contribution of the study is twofold. First, using a framework similar to that in
Hauﬂer and Wooton (1999), we study the role of labor cost diﬀerentials in compe-
tition for FDI. Our theoretical analysis reveals that if two governments compete for
a mobile ﬁrm, the high-wage country is willing to oﬀer a more favorable tax regime.
From the theoretical analysis emerges the prediction that high-wage countries should
3compensate ﬁrms by setting lower corporate tax rates compared to low-wage coun-
tries.
In the second part of the paper, we devise an empirical test of the hypothesis derived
from the model, focusing on statutory corporate income tax rates as the key param-
eters of international tax competition. To solve the evident identiﬁcation problem
when regressing corporate tax rates on wages, we exploit the exogenous variation
in labor cost diﬀerentials in western Europe induced by the sudden integration with
eastern Europe after 1989/90. The idea behind the identiﬁcation strategy is that, de-
pending largely on the geographical position of countries relative to eastern Europe,
some countries in western Europe were more strongly aﬀected than others (in terms
of the competitiveness of their wage levels) by the integration of low-wage countries in
eastern Europe. As long as we use physical distance to deﬁne a composite competitor
for each country, a country’s labor cost relative to this competitor will therefore be
characterized by variation over time that can plausibly be treated as exogenous in a
model of corporate tax setting.
The paper adds to the literature on the determinants of corporate tax rates which
has, somewhat surprisingly, so far largely ignored the role of labor costs. Apart from
Devereux et al. (2008), strategic tax competition among countries has been analyzed
by Davies and Voget (2008) and Overesch and Rincke (2010),1 while Slemrod (2004)
and Winner (2005), e.g., have considered the role of economic openness. Also related
is B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e et al. (2007), who have discussed the role of public infrastructure.
Our data cover a panel of western European countries over the period from 1982
to 2005 and relate statuory corporate income tax rates to two measures of labor
costs: the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’s index of ”Hourly Compensation Costs”
in manufacturing, measuring labor costs relative to U.S. levels, and the ILO’s measure
of unit labor costs. Accounting for the endogeneity of the labor cost diﬀerential, a
number of controls, the impact of common shocks as well as unobserved heterogeneity
1There is a substantial body of empirical literature on tax competition using local data. See,
e.g., Besley and Case (1995), Brett and Pinkse (2000), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), B¨ uttner
(2001), and Bordignon et al., 2003.
4among countries, the empirical analysis provides strong evidence suggesting that
countries with relatively high labor costs tend to set lower corporate income tax
rates. The estimated eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant: If the compensation cost
diﬀerential increases by one percent of the current compensation cost in the U.S.,
ﬁrms are, on average, compensated by a 0.19 percentage point cut in the tax rate.
A one-standard deviation increase in the compensation cost diﬀerential thus triggers
a 5.1 percentage point cut in taxes. If we take into account diﬀerences in labor
productivity, we ﬁnd similar eﬀects: A one-standard deviation increase in the unit
labor cost diﬀerential is estimated to decrease the statutory tax rate by 7.3 to 7.5
percentage points.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model, Section 3 the evidence, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Bidding for FDI: The role of wage diﬀerentials
Our model follows a strand of literature where countries compete for a ﬁxed, discrete
number of international ﬁrms with a lump-sum location tax/subsidy. Most closely
related are Hauﬂer and Wooton (1999) and Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), who model
competition for a single ﬁrm, and Hauﬂer and Wooton (2010), who have recently
extended the analysis to cover the case of competition for many ﬁrms. Other re-
lated theoretical work includes Barros and Cabral (2000), who model diﬀering gains
from FDI, and Ferrett and Wooton (2010a), who examine the role of the ownership
structure. While obviously not mirroring the complex nature of the many features
and traits of business taxation, this class of models has the distinctive advantage of
displaying the eﬀects at work in inter-jurisdictional competition for capital in the
clearest possible way while still maintaining the main trade-oﬀs relevant to our argu-
ment.
Consider a mobile foreign entrant ﬁrm, f, and two countries, A and B, whose markets
5are separated by unit transport costs τ. The entrant produces a homogeneous good,
x, in what is to become a monopolistic market.2 There are n identical households in
country A and 1 − n households in country B.An u m ´ eraire good, z, is produced by
perfectly competitive ﬁrms in both countries, with labor being the only input. Trade
in z is assumed to be free, equalizing wages in the z-industry to w. In addition,
units are scaled such that one unit of labor generates one unit of output, ﬁxing the
competitive wage at unity. Household preferences are given by
ui = αxi − (1/2)βx
2
i + zi,i∈{ A,B}, (1)
yielding linear demand functions for good x. Each household is assumed to inelas-
tically supply one unit of labor. Maximizing ui subject to the household budget





(1 − n)(α − pB)
β
, (2)
as A’s and B’s aggregate demand for x, respectively. Hence country A is the larger
market, as compared to B,i fn>0.5.
Following the related literature, we assume that, for the set-up of the new plant,
the ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost which is suﬃciently large to prevent production at both
locations. Our set-up thus corresponds to a model of export-platform FDI. Note
that serving several countries from one location seems a suitable assumption in the
European setting.
Suppose now that there is a sector-speciﬁc union in country A, but not in country B,
which sets an exogenous wage wA above the competitive one (which prevails in its z
industry), wA >w B =1 . 3 Let subscripts indicate the country to which terms refer
2The absence of incumbent industry implies no loss of generality as long as incumbents would
be symmetrically dispersed. For a discussion of the eﬀects of diﬀerent industry structures, refer to
Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006).
3Alternatively, we could have used a higher labor input requirement in A (i.e., lower manufac-
turing productivity) to model a unit labor cost diﬀerential. Labor cost diﬀerentials have not been
analyzed before in this class of models. Barros and Cabral (2000), in an otherwise similar analysis,
have considered diﬀering shadow prices of labor (but equal wages) across countries, whereas mobile











with the ﬁrst term representing market A and the second one market B proﬁts.
Since the quantity sent to country B amounts to (1−n)(α−τ −wA)/(2β), imposing
strictly positive exports yields a prohibitive level of trade costs of τproh =( α − wA).










(1 − n)(α − τ − wA)2
8β
. (4)
Analogous expressions for proﬁts and consumer surplus hold if f goes to B.
For country A, besides increased consumer surplus because of lower prices, attracting
the outside ﬁrm has the advantage of a higher manufacturing wage income which
is partially borne by foreign consumers. Assuming that f’s after-tax proﬁts are
fully repatriated,4 and that tax receipts are redistributed to residents, welfare WA
is composed of consumer surplus, tax receipts and the ‘extra wage’ earned in the x
industry.5 With f choosing the location where after-tax proﬁts are highest, welfare-
maximizing governments will engage in a bidding race for the outside ﬁrm. A’s gross
gain, before taxes or subsidies, from attracting f is the welfare diﬀerence between









A +( wA − 1)
α − wA − (1 − n)τ
2β
. (5)




i , country i will be prepared to oﬀer a subsidy. Comparing ΔA and ΔB
capital faces a labor cost diﬀerential in our case. Apart from that, in their paper, production (rather
than entry) is subsidized.
4This assumption is not critical for our results. We refer the interested reader to Ferrett and
Wooton (2010b) who show that the equilibrium tax/subsidy oﬀers are independent of the interna-
tional distribution of the mobile ﬁrm’s ownership.
5The latter could alternatively be interpreted as the employment gain in a country with unem-
ployment where the shadow price of labor is lower than the nominal wage.
7at the benchmark case of size symmetry yields
ΔA − ΔB =
(2α − 3wA − τ +1 ) ( wA − 1)
8β
, (6)
which is positive at 1 <w A < (2α − τ +1 ) /3. This reveals that, as long as wA
is not ‘too large’, A will have the stronger incentive to attract f, translating into
a lower minimum tax (higher maximum subsidy) it will be prepared to oﬀer.6 In
what follows, we focus on the situation where the high-wage country is willing to
oﬀer a lower tax, i.e. when the distortion resulting from production taking place in
the high-wage location is not too pronounced.
Having discussed a country’s willingness to pay for the investment, we next have
to determine what it will actually have to oﬀer in equilibrium in order to win the
investment. It is straightforward to determine those ‘minimum winning bids’. Each
country anticipates the maximum oﬀer of the other country which it must outbid,
i.e. it has to bid the rival’s gross gain. On top of that, so as to (just) win the race,
country i has to oﬀer f the proﬁt diﬀerential of what it would earn locating in j,n e t












This expression is increasing in wA, implying a higher subsidy if the wage diﬀerential
gets larger. It also has the intuitive property of falling in n, reﬂecting the fact that
with positive trade costs, it will be the more costly for A to attract the ﬁrm the
smaller is its market. It is immediately obvious that due to its cost disadvantage, A
will not be able to attract the mobile ﬁrm if it has the additional drawback of oﬀering
the smaller market. We therefore focus, much like Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), on the
6If the wage diﬀerential exceeds the abovementioned threshold, the resulting distortion, i.e. the
reduction in consumer surplus due to the increase in the price of x, will become so large that A
would be worse oﬀ when hosting f compared to the ﬁrm going to B.
8non-trivial case where A has the larger market, i.e., 0.5 <n<1.
Now, to complete the argument, note that only if ΔA >O A, country A actually
wants to attract the investment. Setting ΔA equal to OA and solving for τ,w eg e ta














(3α − n(6α − 5) − (1 − n)wA − 2)
2 − 3(2n − 1)(wA − 1)(2α + wA − 3).7
Observe that this suﬃces to show that B does not want to attract the investment:
The diﬀerence in f’s proﬁts, πi − πj,e q u a l sΔ j − Oi = Oj − Δi.8 The intuition why
lower trade costs make it less likely for A to win the investment is straightforward:
Only if markets are suﬃciently separated, a diﬀerence in market size can have the
potential to make entering the high-cost country a proﬁtable option for the foreign
ﬁrm. This, in turn, makes it easier for the high-cost country to attract the investment.
So far the analysis has shown the regime border between the international ﬁrm going
to A or B, respectively. In order to be able to infer the diﬀerential impact of tax
competition on the outcome, we have to compare these results to the outcome that
would prevail if taxes/subsidies could not be used by governments. The analogous
critical value of trade costs above which the ﬁrm goes to A in the absence of tax
policy (obtained from solving πA = πB for τ)e q u a l s
τ
0 =( wA − 1)/(2n − 1). (9)
Conﬁrming our restriction to cases where 0.5 <n<1 from above, we ﬁnd from
(8) and (9) that for 0 <n≤ 0.5, there are no non-prohibitive τcr > 0o rτ0 > 0
7This latter term’s sign is ambiguous because of the square root. However, it is easy to see that
the positive root is the relevant one: Adding the ﬁrst two terms in (8), one obtains an expression
that is larger than tproh. For trade to be viable, therefore, the last term must be positive.










9permitting A to attract f.F o r0 .5 <n<1, however, the critical level of trade costs
τcr in the subsidy race is strictly smaller than the one that would prevail without
subsidies. In between those two trade cost levels, tax policy leads to the mobile ﬁrm’s
settling in country A, in spite of the higher cost, while it would go to B in the absence
of tax competition.9
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect in (n,τ) - space: The dashed line displays the regime
border between A (above) and B (below) winning, respectively, with subsidies. The
solid line is the regime border that would prevail if the use of policy instruments
was ruled out. As is typical for a bidding race, we get subsidies in equilibrium in a
large range of the parameter space. However, upon examination of OA from (7), it is
easy to see that if the high-wage country is large enough and trade costs are above a
certain level, A will even be able to charge a tax in equilibrium despite its higher labor
costs. This occurs in the northeast of the parameter space of Figure 2. Hence, tax
policy gives a country both the opportunity and the incentive to attract investment
where it otherwise would not (due to its relatively disadvantageous position in terms
of labor costs).
9The algebraic demonstration that τcr <τ 0 is as follows: Setting τcr equal to τ0, and solving,
e.g., for α, one obtains
α =
n(wA +1 )− 1
2n − 1
.
Now, α equaling (n(wA +1 )−1)/(2n−1) is inconsistent with τ = τ0 =( wA −1)/(2n−1) lying in
between 0 and τproh = α − wA,a n dwA >w B = 1 while n>0. Having shown that τcr  = τ0 and
noting that the two are continuous, plugging in any values demonstrates that τcr <τ 0.
10Figure 2: The eﬀect of the presence of tax policy on the equilibrium allocation






α =2 ;β =4 ;wB =1 ;wA = wB + 1
10 (α − wB).
3 Evidence
3.1 Estimation approach
The model from Section 2 implies that it may be optimal for governments to com-
pensate ﬁrms for international labor cost diﬀerentials, and that, for moderate labor
cost diﬀerentials, the level of business taxes should negatively depend on a country’s
level of labor costs relative to that of its competitors for FDI. In the following, we
test this implication empirically. For this purpose we use an unbalanced panel of
16 western European countries for the period from 1982 to 2005.10 While it would
be desirable to use the level of direct subsidies to ﬁrms as the dependent variable,
this is impossible for a very practical reason: comprehensive information on the level
of such subsidies is unavailable. We therefore employ as our dependent variable the
statutory corporate income tax rate. This may actually be seen as an advantage over
using subsidies because the tax rate is a fairly broad measure for the attractiveness
10The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK.
11of locations for private investment. In particular, the corporate income tax rate is
relevant even for smaller ﬁrms that often do not have the bargaining power to ob-
tain sizable subsidies. We also expect the statutory tax rate to be less aﬀected by
the business cycle and other temporary country-speciﬁc eﬀects that are diﬃcult to
control for in an empirical analysis.
In order to provide us with a test of the hypothesis delineated from the theoretical
model, the empirical model relates the corporate income tax rate to the labor cost
diﬀerential plus controls. Assuming a linear relation between taxes and labor costs,
our estimation equation reads
TAX it = αΔLCit + Xitβ + γt + ci +  it,i =1...,N, t= 1982,...,2005, (10)
where TAX it represents the corporate income tax rate, ΔLCit is the labor cost dif-
ferential, Xit is a vector of controls, ci denotes country-speciﬁc and γt period-speciﬁc
eﬀects. From the theoretical model we expect a negative α, indicating that countries
with less competitive labor costs tend to set lower tax rates.
The labor cost diﬀerential is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a country’s own labor
cost and that of a predeﬁned composite neighbor, ΔLCit = LCit −

j wijLCjt.T h e
composite neighbor is constructed using weights of competitors wij which are based
on geographical distance, dij, and population, popi. More precisely, these weights




ik for j  = i and wij = 0 for j = i. Using the
squared inverse distance is motivated by the notion that geography matters for the
investment decisions of multinational ﬁrms. In particular, we refer to the evidence on
a negative eﬀect of distance on FDI ﬂows (Carr et al., 2001). Similarly, geographical
distance drives transportation costs for produced goods but also information costs
(Portes and Rey, 2005). Inﬂating the weights by population (in logs) reﬂects the fact
that competing locations with larger markets (all other things equal) should be more
relevant in determining the relative position of a given country than competitors with
small markets. One could argue that GDP would be a better proxy for market size,
but a possible interdependence between TAX i and other countries’ GDP induced
12by ﬁscal externalities would burden the estimation of the model parameters with an
additional endogeneity problem that would be diﬃcult to cope with. We therefore
prefer to use population in the weight formula because it can plausibly be treated as
exogenous to the model.
Note that the weights are normalized such that

j wij =1∀i. This facilitates the
interpretation of α, for the labor cost diﬀerential is simply the diﬀerence between a
country’s own labor cost and the weighted average of costs in competing countries.
As the weights have to be imposed on the model and cannot be tested for their
appropriateness, we report several robustness tests using alternative weight schemes
in the results section.
As regards the choice of an estimator for model (10), it is clear that naive OLS
estimates of the model parameters will generally be uninformative. This is because
there are at least two reasons to believe that causality runs not only from wages
to the tax rate, but also from the tax rate to the wage level. First, as shown by
Devereux and Griﬃth (1998) and B¨ uttner and Ruf (2007), the corporate income tax
is one of the determinants of investment. Consequently, labor market conditions
must be assumed to depend on a country’s attractiveness for private investment and,
therefore, tax policies. Second, a recent literature argues that ﬁrms can shift part of
the burden of a corporate tax onto labor in the form of lower real wages (Hassett and
Mathur, 2006; Felix, 2007; Arulampalam et al., 2007; Desai et al., 2007, Felix and
Hines, 2009).
If the tax rate and the wage level relative to other countries are jointly determined
variables, LCit and  it will be correlated, which renders OLS estimates inconsistent.11
We therefore treat the labor cost diﬀerential as an endogenous regressor and devise
an instrumental variable (IV) approach to obtain consistent estimates for α. Our IV
exploits the breakdown of the communist regimes in eastern Europe around 1989/90
as a source of exogenous variation in labor cost diﬀerentials. More speciﬁcally, we
11As both arguments in favor of reversed causality (from the corporate tax to wages) imply
a negative relation between the tax rate and the wage level, we have no strong prior about the
direction of the bias when estimating α from naive OLS regressions.
13construct and use as an IV an indicator measuring the geographical exposure of the
diﬀerent locations in western Europe to the economic shock that was implied by the
1989 revolution and the subsequent integration between western and eastern Europe.
The indicator is constructed as follows. Based on the count of the number of countries
one has to drive through (or to ﬂy over in case of no land connection) starting from
j’s capital and heading at the closest eastern European capital, DIST EASTj,12 we
construct the IV as

j wij(5 − DIST EASTj) × (2006 − t) × D1990,w h e r eD1990 is
a dummy for post-1989 years.13
Note that the IV captures variation in ΔLCit driven by diﬀerences between countries
in terms of their exposure to countries in eastern Europe with initially low (and then
slowly increasing) relative labor costs. How the instrument captures exogenous vari-
ation in labor cost diﬀerentials can best be understood by looking at two countries
like Austria and France. While Austria had a wage level similar to that of most of its
(western European) competitors before 1989, it suddenly became a high-wage location
relative to its neighbors after 1989: due to its geographical location close to countries
like the Czech and Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Croatia, its labor cost dif-
ferential experienced a signiﬁcant jump when all these low-wage countries became new
competitors for FDI. The instrument

j wij(5−DIST EASTj)×(2006−t)×D1990
captures this shock because the average distance to eastern Europe of Austria’s neigh-
bors is small. In contrast, France is a country that, due to its geographical position,
was much less exposed to the integration shock. Figure 3 illustrates this point and
the rationale for the choice of the instrument by jointly showing the labor cost diﬀer-
ential and the instrument for both countries. By construction of the instrument, we
expect it to be positively correlated with the labor cost diﬀerential, an assumption
that will be conﬁrmed in the ﬁrst-stage regressions reported below.
To ensure the validity of our IV we need to account for the direct eﬀect of the
1989/90 break on taxes. We do this by including as an ordinary regressor an indicator
12Counting both i and the country of the closest eastern European capital, this gives, for instance,
a value of one for Poland, two for Germany, three for France, and four for the UK.
13Using (5−DIST EASTi)×(2006−t)×D1990 as IV gives similar, but statistically less signiﬁcant
results.
































































































































































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Compensation cost diﬀerential deﬁned as a country’s own labor cost minus that of neighbors,
ΔLCit = LCit−

j wijLCjt. Instrument deﬁned as

j wij(5−DIST EASTj)×(2006−t)×D1990.
See text for details.
equal to (5 − DIST EASTi) × (1989 − t) × D1990. Note that, in contrast to our IV,
(5−DIST EASTi)×(1989−t)×D1990 does not show a discrete jump in 1990, reﬂecting
the fact that the economic integration between East and West was a gradual process
rather than an immediate result of the 1989/90 revolution. As an alternative, we
use the indicator BORDERi × (1989 − t) × D1990,w h e r eBORDERi is a dummy
for western European countries with immediate eastern European neighbors.14 Note
also that using the integration shock to identify the impact of labor cost diﬀerentials
implies that only western European countries can be used for estimation. However,
the available data on eastern Europe is used to compute ΔLCit.
To estimate Equation (10), we use the statutory corporate income tax rate15 to-
gether with a compensation cost index (U.S.=100) provided by the U.S. Bureau of
14The group comprises Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Sweden.
15We would like to thank Michael Overesch (ZEW Mannheim) for generously sharing his tax
data with us.
15Labor Statistics (BLS), comprising hourly compensation costs in manufacturing with
a compensation cost index (USA=100). These are prepared by the BLS speciﬁcally
in order to assess international diﬀerences in employer labor costs. The measure in-
cludes hourly direct pay and employer social insurance expenditures and other labor
taxes. The exchange rates used are prevailing commercial market exchange rates. In
addition, we use unit labor costs in manufacturing, representing the current cost of
labor per ‘real quantity unit’ of output produced, taken from the ILO’s ‘Key Indica-
tors of the Labor Market’ database. This indicator represents a direct link between
productivity and the cost of labor used in generating output, and it is speciﬁcally
designed as an indicator of countries’ cost competitiveness.
As regards the control variables, we follow the literature on the determinants of cor-
porate tax rates and include country size (GDP or population in logs), and a measure
for openness (share of exports and imports in GDP). We also control for preferences
for public expenditures (percentage of population below 15 and above 65 years).16
A further variable that needs to be considered is the personal income tax. Slemrod
(2004) has argued that an increasing gap between personal and corporate income
taxes may lead to an incentive to defer taxes by means of excessive retention of cap-
ital income at the corporate level. The corporate income tax may therefore serve as
a backstop for the personal income tax. Indeed, Slemrod (2004) (and a number of
more recent studies cited in the introduction) have found the top personal income
tax rate to be positively correlated with the corporate income tax. Although Slem-
rod’s argument is compelling, we are somewhat reluctant to treat the top personal
income tax as a control variable, for the point to include it among the regressors
also suggests it to be jointly determined with the corporate income tax. However,
without a convincing instrument for the personal income tax in sight, treating it as
an endogenous regressor is a serious complication. In light of these diﬃculties, we
prefer to omit the top personal income tax rate from our baseline regressions. We
then check the robustness of our ﬁndings by including it as an ordinary regressor.
16Data sources for the control variables are Eurostat and the World Development Indicators of
the World Bank.
16Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Statutory tax rate 0.393 0.102 0.125 0.659
Compensation cost diﬀerential a 5.79 27.1 -56.8 96.9
Unit labor cost diﬀerential a 0.031 0.165 -0.527 0.541
Log(GDP) 12.2 1.34 8.22 14.5
Log(Population) 9.37 1.37 5.90 11.3
Openness 0.870 0.510 0.366 2.89
% young 0.183 0.026 0.139 0.303
% old 0.149 0.018 0.105 0.197
Top personal income tax rate 0.547 0.102 0.390 0.870
(5 − DIST EAST) × (1989 − t) × D1990 -14.1 14.6 -48.0 0
BORDER× (1989 − t) × D1990 -2.09 3.80 -13.0 0

j wij(5 − DIST EASTj) × (2006 − t) × D1990
a 11.4 11.4 0 46.1
Unbalanced panel (16 countries, years 1982-1989 and 1993-2005, 304 observations).
a Competitors’ weights based on squared inverse distance and population (in logs).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. We note that the key variables are character-
ized by substantial variation. The statutory tax ranges from 0.125 (Ireland, 2003-05)
to 0.67 (Sweden, 1982-83). The compensation cost diﬀerential varies from values be-
low -50 in Portugal throughout the 1990s and 2000s and values above 90 in Austria
and Germany in the mid 1990s. The maximum compensation cost diﬀerential in the
sample thus comes close to the absolute level of compensation costs in the U.S. (re-
call that the compensation cost index is indexed by the value 100 for the U.S. in
all years). The unit labor cost diﬀerential also varies substantially, showing values
below -0.5 in Ireland in the mid 2000s and values above 0.5 in Austria (mid 1990s)
and Norway (mid 2000s). Note that due to missing data for labor costs in eastern
Europe prior to 1993, we do not make use of the cross-sections 1990-1992.
3.2 Results
In presenting the results of our empirical analysis, we will proceed in three steps.
First, we will brieﬂy discuss simple OLS estimations which ignore the likely endo-
geneity of the wage diﬀerential. Second, we will present the 2SLS estimation results
17for a number of baseline estimations. Third, we will report on some robustness checks
of our main ﬁndings.
Let us ﬁrst turn to the OLS estimations, assembled in Table 2. Columns (1) to (3)
report estimations using the compensation cost diﬀerential as our main explanatory
variable. In columns (1) and (2) we check whether measuring country size by GDP or
population makes any diﬀerence, but the coeﬃcient of the labor cost diﬀerential turns
out to be insigniﬁcant in both regressions. In column (3) we use the top personal
income tax rate as an additional regressor. We now obtain a weakly signiﬁcant
(10% level) negative eﬀect of the labor cost diﬀerential. Among the controls, we ﬁnd
a positive coeﬃcient for GDP (in logs), conﬁrming the result familiar from other
studies that larger economies tend to set higher corporate tax rates. Moreover, the
estimations point to a positive partial correlation between the statutory tax rates and
the percentage of elderly people as our proxy for the demand for public services and
welfare, and the top personal income tax rate. Finally, the results suggest that more
open economies have lower tax rates. While all these ﬁndings are well in line with
previous studies, our results regarding the role of relative labor costs are inconclusive.
Turning to the estimations using the unit labor costs instead of compensation costs
to measure the relative cost of labor in columns (4) to (6), we ﬁnd the results for
the control variables conﬁrmed. However, the coeﬃcients for the unit labor cost
diﬀerential is insigniﬁcant across all estimations.
The next step is to see whether accounting for the likely endogeneity of the labor cost
diﬀerential makes any diﬀerence. Before turning to the main results it is instructive to
have a brief look at the ﬁrst-stage regression outcomes, displayed in Table 3. The ﬁrst
three columns report ﬁrst-stage regressions for the compensation cost diﬀerential. Ir-
respective of whether and how we control for a possible direct eﬀect of the integration
shock on tax rates (coeﬃcients of remaining control variables not reported), we ﬁnd
a strong positive partial correlation between the compensation cost diﬀerential and
the instrument,

j wij(5−DIST EASTj)×(2006−t)×D1990. Hence, the ﬁrst-stage

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19noting that the diagnostic statistics regarding the strength of the instrument are quite
impressive, with partial values of the R2 between 0.31 and 0.37 and F-statistics of
the IV between 19.8 and 30.6. Columns (4) to (6) show the ﬁrst-stage regressions for
the unit labor cost diﬀerential. Again we ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant positive partial cor-
relation between the diﬀerential and the instrument. While the diagnostic statistics
are weaker than in the regressions for the compensation cost diﬀerential, they still
signal that we do not have to worry about problems of weak identiﬁcation. Taken
together, the ﬁrst-stage results lend strong support to our instruments.
Having conﬁrmed that the instrument provides suﬃcient variation to identify the
eﬀect of the labor cost diﬀerential on tax rates (assuming that the instrument is
exogenous), we can now turn to the results for the main regression. Table 4 displays
results of a set of baseline two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations accounting for
the endogeneity of labor cost diﬀerentials.17 Columns (1) to (3) use the compensation
cost diﬀerential as the key explanatory variable. Irrespective of whether and how
we control for the direct eﬀect of the 1989/90 shock on tax policies, the estimates
point to a statistically signiﬁcant impact of labor cost diﬀerentials on tax rates. As
suggested by the theoretical model, the estimated eﬀect is negative, meaning that
countries with relatively high labor costs tend to set lower corporate income tax
rates. But the estimated eﬀects are also economically signiﬁcant: If the compensation
cost diﬀerential increases by one percent of the current compensation cost in the
U.S., ﬁrms are, on average, compensated by a 0.19 percentage point cut in the tax
rate. A one-standard deviation increase in the compensation cost diﬀerential thus
triggers a 5.1 percentage point cut in taxes. Among the control variables, we conﬁrm
the familiar result that bigger and more economically closed countries have higher
corporate taxes. Moreover, the results point to the percentage of elderly people and
the associated need for social services to be positively correlated with taxes.
If we take into account diﬀerences in labor productivity we ﬁnd similar eﬀects. As
shown in columns (4) to (6), a one-standard deviation increase in the unit labor cost
17Due to the limited number of cross-sectional observations, we report standard errors which are




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22diﬀerential is estimated to decrease the statutory tax rate by 7.3 to 7.5 percentage
points. It is reassuring to see that the eﬀect of labor costs on taxes is stronger when
productivity diﬀerences are taken into account, for simple labor cost diﬀerentials
should partly reﬂect cross-country diﬀerences in labor productivity.
Table 5 is devoted to a number of robustness checks of our main ﬁndings. For
brevity, we only display results for estimations using unit labor costs to deﬁne the
key explanatory variable. Similarly, we use (5 − DIST EASTi) × (1989 − t) × D1990
to account for the direct eﬀect of the integration shock on taxes in all regressions
reported. Hence, the point of reference for all estimations in Table 5 is column (5)
from Table 4. Column (1) reports a 2SLS estimation where we account for market
size by population (in logs) instead of GDP. The coeﬃcient of the unit labor cost
diﬀerential is still signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level and very close to the one obtained
using log(GDP). Column (2) adds the top personal income tax rate. The eﬀect of
the labor cost diﬀerential is now somewhat smaller, but still very close to the value
obtained before. We conclude that potential endogeneity problems associated with
using GDP and the top personal income tax rate as explanatory variables are of no
practical importance for our study.
The remaining columns report robustness checks with respect to the weight matrix
that we have to impose in order to be able to derive the labor cost diﬀerential. First,
we display an estimation where the cost diﬀerential (together with the instrument) has
been derived using wij =l n ( popj)/dij to compute the weights.18 Hence, in contrast
to the estimations in Table 4 and those reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5,
we employ a weaker form of distance decay. We note that the coeﬃcient of the labor
cost diﬀerential is now signiﬁcantly larger. At the same time, it is estimated with
much less precision. The result that weights with an insuﬃcient degree of distance
decay produce imprecise coeﬃcient estimates in panel applications is familiar from
the applied literature dealing with cross-sectional dependence.19 The problem can
18Note that, as before, we standardize the weights such that

j wij =1∀i before computing the
average labor cost of competitors.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24best be understood by considering the extreme case with no distance decay at all.
Using wij =l n ( popj), for instance, would provide us with a measure for neighbors’
labor costs at time t,
N
j=1 wijLCjt, that does not vary across i for N →∞ .I n
a ﬁnite sample, the labor cost diﬀerential would thus boil down to a country’s own
cost, minus a variable that, for increasing N, approaches a period-speciﬁc constant
equal to the average labor costs of all countries in the sample. As a consequence, we
could no longer identify the labor cost diﬀerential in our estimations. Noting that
our instrument is also based on the weights, it seems natural that 2SLS estimates
with insuﬃcient distance decay tend to be imprecise. This notion is supported by the
diagnostic statistics reported at the bottom of Table 5. Both the partial R2 and the
F-statistic of the instrument decrease considerably once we employ weights based on
ln(popj)/dij.
Turning to column (4) we note that, while a suﬃcient degree of distance decay is
essential for our purpose, the adjustment of weights according to population is not.
With weight scheme wij =1 /d2
ij, we obtain results which are again very similar to
those from the ﬁrst two columns. In accordance with the discussion of the role of
distance decay for identiﬁcation, we ﬁnd that the diagnostic statistics indicate the
presence of a strong instrument. Finally, column (5) presents an estimation using
weights based on simple inverse distance, wij =1 /dij. The outcome conﬁrms our
previous ﬁnding that insuﬃcient distance decay gives rise to an imprecise estimate
of α and a performance of the instrument which is not satisfactory according to all
established standards.
Finally, columns (6) and (7) test for robustness regarding the speciﬁcation of the
instrumental variable. As an alternative to the speciﬁcation used so far, one might
think of using only variation in labor cost diﬀerentials for identiﬁcation that is related
to the diﬀerence in terms of exposure to the integration shock between border and
non-border countries. The most straightforward way to capture this variation is to
use as an instrumental variable the interaction between BORDERi and the indicator
for post-shock years, D1990. Column (6) shows the outcome of the 2SLS procedure
25when using weights based on ln(popj)/d2
ij, while column (7) uses weights derived from
1/d2
ij. The results conﬁrm the negative impact of the unit labor cost diﬀerential on
the tax rate at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance. We also note, however, that the
point estimates are higher compared to the reference estimation from Table 4, column
(5), and signiﬁcantly less precise. Furthermore, the F-statistic of the IV indicates
that BORDERi × D1990 is not as strong a predictor of the labor cost diﬀerential
as

j wij(5 − DIST EASTj) × (2006 − t) × D1990. We conclude that estimations
exploiting for identiﬁcation only the diﬀerence in exposure to the integration shock
between border and non-border countries generally support the ﬁndings obtained
using the more elaborate instrumental variable, but that accounting for the diﬀerences
between western European countries in terms of their geographical position relative
to eastern Europe in a more ﬂexible way signiﬁcantly improves the precision of our
estimates.
4 Discussion
We have developed a simple model highlighting the behavior of governments in a
bidding race for FDI when countries diﬀer in labor costs. The key insight from the
model is that governments of high-wage countries tend to set tax policies which are
more favorable for ﬁrms than policies chosen by low-wage countries. Hence, the
model lends support to the notion that diﬀerences in corporate income tax policies
can at least partly be explained as government policies devised to compensate ﬁrms
for international labor cost diﬀerentials. We have then put the model prediction to an
empirical test. Using data on western Europe, we have estimated a substantial eﬀect
of labor cost diﬀerentials on corporate tax rates, conﬁrming the model prediction.
Our results are in line with preliminary ﬁndings discussed by Overesch and Rincke
(2009), who analyze the tax response of western European countries to the breakdown
of communism in 1989 and come to the conclusion that wage diﬀerentials are a
more plausible driving force (compared to strategic competition in tax rates) for the
26signiﬁcant tax cuts in those western European countries located geographically close
to eastern Europe.
Testing the hypothesis of governments compensating ﬁrms for wage diﬀerentials with
European data covering the 1989/90 break is advantageous because the breakdown of
communism in eastern Europe lends itself as a credible source of exogenous variation
in wage diﬀerentials. However, it also carries a limitation because the cross-sectional
dimension of the data set is rather small. An obvious alternative would be to consider
the U.S. states, where data availability is less of an issue.20 We experimented with
U.S. data, but could not come up with conclusive results. This might have to do
with the fact that the variation in tax rates over time in the U.S. is very limited
for most states, and that it is diﬃcult to identify a source of exogenous variation
that can be exploited to construct instrumental variables. We experimented with
data on unionization and other labor market institutions, but the problem of limited
variation over time appeared to be present here, too. Hence, although the cross-
sectional variation is very limited in our application, it seems that coming up with
more promising data is not at all an easy task.
The policy conclusion of our analysis is that if labor unions are successful in setting
wages above the competitive level, this may not only cause unemployment, but also
force the government to compensate ﬁrms by reducing corporate income taxes. Hence,
unions which are successful in the sense that they manage to implement a high
wage level will perhaps also trigger tax policies which unionists often characterize as
favoring the interests of ‘capital’ over those of ‘labor’.
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